If major roads were privately owned and freed of government regulation, the setting of speed limits would be a commercial decision. Entrepreneurs would seek to attract customers to their routes in order to maximise toll revenues, and one way of doing so would be to offer fast journey times by allowing high speeds.
But road owners would also face a series of trade-offs when setting speed limits. Under busy conditions, high speeds can reduce capacity, which in turn would reduce toll revenues. And in some locations, high speeds could increase the risk of accidents, potentially damaging the reputation of operators and reducing revenues through delays and higher insurance costs.
To a large extent, trade-offs between speed and other considerations would be time and place specific, depending on the nature of the infrastructure and its usage patterns. Moreover, since the decisions would be commercial, they would be beyond the scope of politics and the undue influence of special interest groups.
In this context, it is inconceivable that private road operators would set speed limits that not only increased journey times and lowered productivity but also worsened congestion and raised significantly the risk of serious accidents. Yet such controls are imposed by the government with its centralised approach to speed on state-owned roads.
Perhaps the most egregious example is the national 40mph limit imposed on heavy goods vehicles on single carriageway routes. This imposes substantial delays and productivity losses on the road haulage sector. And since roads carry around 70 per cent of freight within the UK, this has a significant impact on the wider economy. Worse still, slow-moving trucks create long tailbacks of other road users, for whom the national limit on such roads is 60mph. Delayed and frustrated, car drivers and motorists frequently engage in dangerous overtaking manoeuvres – the cause of a high proportion of fatalities and serious injuries on the network.
The government is currently considering raising the lorry limit on single carriageways to either 45mph or 50mph, but the move is opposed by various special interests. If roads are to remain outside the market economy for the foreseeable future, then transport policymakers should at least adopt a more commercial approach to managing the network. This means raising speed limits where it benefits users and basing policy on a rational consideration of the economic trade-offs rather than the demands of lobby groups.

@Parimal Kumar - On point 1) you are correct but there will also be a proportion of drivers who would overtake a lorry travelling at 40mph but wouldn't bother at 50mph since the time savings would be much smaller. We discuss the issues raised in point 4) in our recent monograph on road privatisation: http://www.iea.org.uk/publications/research/which-road-ahead-government-.... Point 5) is examined in this blog post, which argues that rail privatisation in many ways increased the degree of state control: http://www.iea.org.uk/blog/regulation-not-privatisation-to-blame-for-ine...
@Parimal Kumar - Regarding point 3), not everyone involved in the debate should be classed as a special interest. One of the arguments in the article is that under private ownership, special interest influence would be fundamentally weakened. In the absence of markets, policymakers should focus primarily on the economic arguments rather than the views of pressure groups.
@HJ - Non-motorised users are mentioned in the monograph, but there wasn't space to discuss them in any detail. They represent a very small fraction of passenger miles. Cycling, for example, accounts for roughly 1%.
@HJ - Entrepreneurial discovery is a major theme of the private roads monograph. Freed of state control, road entrepreneurs would discover new and innovative ways of serving consumers. In this context, one cannot know in advance what patterns of usage would develop in an unhampered transport market.
Another theme is the importance of liberating land-use planning if the full benefits of deregulating transport are to be enjoyed. In this context, examples such as Cambridge, where state intervention in transport and planning is all pervasive, are of little relevance to the argument.
@HJ - In the monograph it is suggested that rights of way might only be removed in those roads that exclusively provide access to adjoining properties, such as cul-de-sacs and so on. The only people using such rights of way are those using them to reach those properties. It is envisaged that longstanding rights of way for pedestrians and cyclists on through roads would be kept and this is explicitly stated in the text. Thus there is no possibility of people finding it impossible to get to work or buy essential items, as the necessary access rights are maintained. Moreover, there are strong market incentives for private road owners to facilitate widespread access, as is the case in privately owned shopping centres and so on.
Regarding entrepreneurship, the analysis is well grounded in economic theory, for example the work of Kirzner. However, as we explain, the pervasive nature of state intervention in the transport sector makes the use of empirical evidence problematic.
@HJ To quote from p. 76 of the monograph, 'many residential roads do not constitute long-standing rights of way. Their purpose is merely to provide access to the adjoining properties.' In some locations there could be significant benefits from transferring ownership to residents and allowing them to restrict access to such roads. For example, in inner cities they could be gated off to reduce crime and anti-social behaviour. Parking is another problem that could be addressed by giving residents control over such roads (in some areas they might wish to restrict parking, in others to expand it).
@LoveloBicycles - The external costs of road transport are largely the result of state intervention rather than road-use per se. Take congestion, which is by far the largest 'externality' associated with road transport. It is clearly a symptom of a) the absence of market pricing; b) the related failure of state-supply of roads to respond to consumer demand; and c) strict state planning controls that hamper the adaptation of settlements to road transport. Cost-benefit analyses of cycling schemes are clearly contingent on the above distortions and also often rely on dubious scientific evidence on matters such as the effect of air pollution on health, the social costs of climate change and so on.
@HJ - Residential roads might be defined as those whose purpose is to provide access to adjoining properties, as opposed to 'mixed-use' or 'intermediate' roads that also provide through routes and are much more problematic to transfer out of state control. Clearly it is a matter of degree, and we do not prescribe the exact boundaries in the monograph. This area would benefit from further research work and theorising. Nonetheless, we do set out a process by which 'intermediate' roads could gradually move out of state control through a process of private planning. New private urban developments would include private roads and such districts would gradually displace state districts over time. This does of course assume the liberalisation of the planning system. In my view there should be no obligation for property owners to provide suitable access facilities for rights of way crossing their properties, since this would effectively be a taking under threat of force. In the case of footpaths, they generally remain accessible as long as they are used regularly.
@HJ - I am not contradicting myself. There is a clear distinction between having a right of way and forcing the property owner to provide particular facilities along that right of way, or indeed forcing the owner to maintain that right of way in its existing condition. Moreover, in the scenario suggested it is envisaged that while motorways, some trunk roads and many residential roads could quite quickly be transferred into non-state ownership, for the time being 'intermediate' roads would tend to remain under, say, local authority control. By a gradual process, if planning liberalisation took place, privately planned and owned settlements would gradually displace state districts in a similar way that some urban areas grow (e.g. Las Vegas) and others decline (e.g. Detroit). Access arrangements for private districts could be set out in contract and subject to the entrepreneurial discovery process. As stated above, there would be strong incentives to provide widespread access to employment and retail operations within private districts. Why on earth would employers move to a district their workers couldn't reach or retailers to an area which banned shoppers?
@LoveloBicycles - The cost of accidents is already covered by the insurance paid by road users. And in the UK the NHS recovers the cost of treating accident victims from the insurance companies. Urban air pollution and noise externalities are already to some extent 'internalised' by land markets, e.g. home buyers pay less if they buy properties close to a busy road, though this process would work far more effectively under a freed land market and private planning. Indeed, current planning policies push developers into building on brownfield sites next to transport corridors with high levels of noise and air pollution. Market pricing is capable of dealing with these issues, with the exception, in theory at least, of larger scale phenomena such as anthropogenic climate change. The question of externalities from road use is discussed in detail in my recent paper, Time to Excise Fuel Duty? http://www.iea.org.uk/publications/research/time-to-excise-fuel-duty
@Parimal Kumar - I don't mention the RHA in my article, or have I missed something?
@HJ - There are clearly a number of problems with the existing law on rights of way, which is why a change in that law is suggested as a possibility in the monograph. (Although it should be pointed out that current law is not an insurmountable obstacle to road privatisation). The obligation to keep public rights of way useable clearly constitutes a forcible taking from the property owner. Moreover, there is another objection on grounds of efficiency - i.e. that resources must be expended to keep routes useable even if they are hardly ever used.
@Parimal Kumar - It wouldn't be the case that major roads under private ownership would suffer poor maintenance. In fact, private owners would tend to have much stronger incentives to improve the quality of roads in order to better serve their customers. The monopoly issue is discussed at length in Chapter 2 of Which Road Ahead - Government or Market? Some of the points made include 1) that competition exists from numerous other modes, e.g. rail, air, pipeline, shipping, teleworking etc.; 2) that liberalising planning rules would reduce barriers to entry, creating the threat or reality of competition, and influencing pricing/maintenance behaviour accordingly; and 3) that road owners would also have incentives to provide a good service at a reasonable price for fear of displacing economic activity (and hence toll revenues) to competing transport corridors. For example, entrepreneurs building new distribution centres might choose to avoid routes that were, from their perspective, overpriced or poorly maintained.
@Lovelo Bicycles - Motor insurance covers a high proportion of accident-related NHS costs, but I'm not sure that it's precisely calibrated, given, for example, the difficulties of determining causation for some long-term health problems. It should also be borne in mind that NHS treatment costs are likely to be far higher than under a deregulated, freed healthcare market.
And as far as I know, police and fire services are paid out of general taxation. It should be borne in mind that road users pay considerable sums in fuel duty and VED (c. £40bn p.a.).
Regarding your next question, under current rules homeowners receive compensation when a new road is built next to their property. There is no compensation, however, for increased traffic on an existing route. Nevertheless, the risk of increased traffic is surely reflected in the purchase price, in the same way that someone buying a house in West London might consider the probability that the number of flights using Heathrow is likely to increase, as it has for the last several decades.
On the issue of efficiency, many shorter journeys are made by car as a result of the time savings achieved. A 2-mile journey to the shops might take 4 minutes by car versus say 12 minutes by bike, and the car also makes bulk shopping possible, offering further savings by reducing the number of shopping trips necessary etc.
@HJ - I accept your points about bikes being preferable for some travellers. Transport patterns and modal choices under a free-market system based on voluntary exchanges are difficult to predict in advance, particularly if one also assumes the liberalisation of the planning system. It's possible that such liberalisation would lead to more dispersed settlements, which would tend, ceteris paribus, to favour motorised transport over cycling, but cyclists would also be free to develop their own districts.
@LoveloBicycles - Since the mid-90s, urban planning policies have deliberately made life difficult for motorists, with parking rationed at new developments and often located inconveniently. Similar policies were instigated in East Germany in order to encourage residents to use public transport. Under a market system, urban planning would be market driven rather than determined by the environmentalist agenda of the bureaucratic elite. It should also be pointed out that the costs of motoring have been enormously inflated by tax and regulation, putting it out of reach for poorer households.
@Parimal Kumar - The market would be far more effective at pricing the 'external' costs and benefits of motoring than the current political/bureaucratic mechanisms. Take congestion, for example, which is typically cited as by far the largest external cost of road transport. In the market economy, scarce road space could be priced in order to minimise delays and maximise revenues. Pricing would also act as a signal for investors such that shortages of road space could be addressed. This would be in marked contrast to the current system, in which new capacity tends to be built for political reasons (e.g. regeneration schemes) rather than where it is most needed. As explained in a previous response, local environmental problems can be addressed through the liberalisation of the planning system. All this is explained at length in Which Road Ahead: Government or Market? with additional discussion of externalities in Time to Excise Fuel Duty? and The Railways, the Market and the Government. What makes you think the government and officials will do a better job at pricing externalities?
@LoveloBicycles - You are correct that any privatisation process will inevitably be affected by the legacy of decades of state ownership of the road network, but you cannot know precisely what modal split etc. would have evolved in the absence of state intervention. It may be the case that cycling would be an even smaller share than it is currently because a liberal planning environment without green belts and compact city polices would have enabled a much greater spatial dispersal of economic activities.
Freed transport and land-use markets would allow entrepreneurs to experiment with different options, for example, by building districts with excellent cycling facilities. These experiments would then be tested in the market according to levels of consumer demand. Importantly, freed markets allow different preferences on transport and land-use to co-exist, in contrast to the one-size-fits-all controls imposed by state regulation. Freed markets also take account of externalities in a way that reflects individual preferences for environmental goods rather than the top-down preferences of political and bureaucratic elites.
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